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Article 4

Ehlmann: Minnesota's Special Compensation Fund

MINNESOTA'S SPECIAL COMPENSATION FUND
by

WINSTON EHLMANNt

Workers' compensation benefitsfor second injurieshave undergonefrequent
change as the Legislature has attempted to balance the responsibility to
pay for an employee's second injury among insurers, employers, and the
Minnesota Special Compensation Fund In this Article, Mr. Ehlmann
traces the development of Minnesota's second-injuy law and explains
some specific difficulties that arise when tying to reach afair apportionment of liability. By comparing Minnesota's law to that of other states,
the author explains why the Minnesota Fundpays out benefits that are
significantly higher than other states.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The industrial revolution of the nineteenth century produced a
dramatic increase in industrial accidents.' Workers' compensation
statutes were enacted in most states to ease the financial hardship
on workers injured in employment-related accidents because innot Member, Minnesota Bar. Mr. Ehlmann received his B.A. degree from the University of Minnesota in 1949 and his J.D. degree from the St. Paul College of Law in 1955.
Upon graduation from law school, Mr. Ehlmann practiced law in St. Paul and has been
with the Attorney General's office for the past twenty years. He is presently an Assistant
Attorney General in the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry.
1. Cf I A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 4.00 (1978) (sharp
increase in industrial accidents made workers' compensation legislation necessary).
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vative employer defenses forced employees to shoulder the greater
burden of economic loss. 2 By 1949, every state had enacted a

workers' compensation act. 3 The basic scheme of such laws was to
provide a comprehensive system for compensating injured employees regardless of fault or negligence. 4 Strict liability was imposed
2. With the growth of industry arose new common-law defenses to employer liability
for work-related injuries. From 19th century England came the three major defenses that
barred recovery by injured employees. In Priestley v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Exch.
Ch. 1837), the fellow-servant rule was articulated. This rule provided that one servant,
injured at the hand of another servant while both were engaged in their master's work,
had no right of recovery against the master. Priestle also spawned the doctrine of assumed
risk: a servant assumes the obvious risks of employment voluntarily and therefore has no
right of recovery against his nonnegligent master for work-related injuries. Finally, from
Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809), came the principle of contributory
negligence: one who in any way contributed to his own injury had no cause of action. See
generally I A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 4.30 (discussing common-law defenses).
These defenses crossed the Atlantic and settled into the American common law, their
ready acceptance being attributed to judges' inclinations to encourage industrial enterprise by easing the burdens of the industrialist. See W. DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 7 (1936).
In Minnesota, the fellow-servant rule was adopted in 1869: "A master, guilty of no
personal negligence or misconduct, is not responsible to his servant for injuries resulting to
the latter from the negligence, carelessness or misconduct of a fellow servant engaged in
the same general business." Foster v. Minnesota Cent. Ry., 14 Minn. 360, 362 (Gil. 277,
279-80) (1869); accord, Neal v. Northern Pac. R.R., 57 Minn. 365, 369, 59 N.W. 312, 313
(1894); Brown v. Winona & St. P.R.R., 27 Minn. 162, 163, 6 N.W. 484, 485 (1880). In
1880, the Minnesota court stated that an employee assumes the risk of employment when
he can readily observe the hazardous custom of conducting the business. Hughes v.
Winona & St. P.R.R., 27 Minn. 137, 140-41, 6 N.W. 553, 554 (1880); accord, Lawson v.
Truesdale, 60 Minn. 410, 414-16, 62 N.W. 546, 547 (1895); Woods v. St. Paul & D.R.R.,
39 Minn. 435, 436-37, 40 N.W. 510, 511-12 (1888); Russell v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 32
Minn. 230, 234, 20 N.W. 147, 147-48 (1884); Clark v. St. Paul & S.C.R.R., 28 Minn. 128,
130-32, 9 N.W. 581, 582-83 (1881); Fleming v. St. Paul & D.R.R., 27 Minn. 111, 114-15, 6
N.W.448, 449 (1880). By 1866, the principle of contributory negligence was well established. The Minnesota court stated that the common law denied recovery of damages to
an employee whose injury was "attributable in any degree to his own negligence, and
want of care .... ." McMahon v. Davidson, 12 Minn. 357, 372 (Gil. 232, 249) (1867),
appeal d:rnmtsed sub nom. Davidson v. Starcher, 154 U.S. 566 (1869); accord, Whittier v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 24 Minn. 394, 405 (1878); Donaldson v. Milwaukee & St. P.
Ry., 21 Minn. 293, 297 (1875); Carroll v. Minnesota Valley R.R., 13 Minn. 30, 34 (Gil. 18,
21) (1868).
3. Se 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 5.30. Minnesota's workers' compensation statute
was adopted in 1913. See Act of Apr. 24, 1913, ch. 467, 1913 Minn. Laws 675 (current
version at MINN. STAT. §§ 176.011-.82 (1978 & Supp. 1979), as amendedby Act of Mar. 28,
1980, ch. 384, § 2, 1980 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 100, 100 (West), as amended by Act of Mar.
28, 1980, ch. 385, 1980 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 102 (West), as amended by Act of Mar. 28,
1980, ch. 389, 1980 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 104 (West), as amendedby Act of Mar. 28, 1980,
ch. 392, 1980 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 107 (West), as amended by Act of Mar. 31, 1980, ch.
414, § 2, 1980 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 130, 130 (West), as amended by Act of Apr. 11, 1980,
ch. 556, § 12, 1980 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 715, 721 (West)).
4. See I A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 1.10.
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on the employer while the employee's recovery was limited by a
fixed schedule. 5 The rule evolved that the employer takes the employee as he finds him. 6 The question of whether, under the circumstances, an average person would have been injured is not
pertinent in determining employer liability.' However, the general rule that the employer is strictly liable for the job-related injury was inadequate to deal with the situation in which an
employee who is injured has a preexisting disability. 8 Generally,
the risk of employing a person with a preexisting disability rests on
the employer, who is held liable for the entire disability resulting
from the combination of the present compensable injury and the
prior disability. 9 The injury may merge with the preexisting infirmity to create a greater disability than would have occurred from
the present injury alone.' 0 Hence, an employer may hesitate to
5. See id.; Note, Workmen's Compensation. Florida Subsequent Injuly Law, 26 U. FLA. L.
807, 808 (1974).
6. See, e.g., Perry v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 66 Cal. App. 3d 887, 891,
136 Cal. Rptr. 309, 310 (1977); Larson v. Davidson-Boutell Co., 258 Minn. 64, 68, 102
N.W.2d 712, 716 (1960); Gillette v. Harold, Inc., 257 Minn. 313, 322, 101 N.W.2d 200,
207 (1960); Pearson v. Ford Motor Co., 186 Minn. 155, 158, 242 N.W. 721, 722 (1932).
7. See, e.g., Zappa v. Charles Mfg. Co., 260 Minn. 217, 223, 109 N.W.2d 420, 424
(1961); Larson v. Davidson-Boutell Co., 258 Minn. 64, 68, 102 N.W.2d 712, 716 (1960);
Gillette v. Harold, Inc., 257 Minn. 313, 322, 101 N.W.2d 200, 207 (1960); Root v. City of
Duluth, 247 Minn. 243, 248, 76 N.W.2d 698, 701 (1956); Marsolek v. Miller Waste Mills,
244 Minn. 55, 58, 69 N.W.2d 617, 619 (1955).
8. See 2 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 59 (1976).
9. See Reinert, The Role of the Second Injuky Fund in Occupational Diseases, 14 FORUM
495, 496 (1979); Note, supra note 5, at 809. A minority of states still apply the full-responsibility rule imposing complete liability for the entire combined disability upon the employer. See, e.g., Perry v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 66 Cal. App. 3d 887, 136
Cal. Rptr. 309 (1977) (employee entitled to compensation for hernia that was inoperable
because of previous cardiac condition of nonindustrial origin); Raskoff v. Long Island
Daily Press, 38 A.D.2d 644, 327 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1971) (mem.) (preexisting deafness in one
ear was of no consequence in awarding damages for 100% binaural loss of hearing); Note,
supra note 5, at 809-10. See generally 2 A. LARSON, sura note 1, § 59.10 (1976). Some
states have attempted to resolve the employer's dilemma through apportionment statutes
whereby the employer pays only for the disability from the second injury. See id. § 59.20.
Apportionment does not apply, however, when the preexisting condition was not compensable. See, e.g., Carbonaro v. Chinatown Sea Food, Inc., 55 A.D.2d 756, 757, 389 N.Y.S.2d
640, 641 (1976) (mem.) (no apportionment because current disability unrelated to prior
back injury).
The Minnesota court has refused to apportion liability absent statutory authority.
See, e.g., Wallace v. Hanson Silo Co., 305 Minn. 395, 235 N.W.2d 363 (1975); Byrd v.
State, 305 Minn. 398, 234 N.W.2d 589 (1975) (per curiam).
10. For example, if an employer hires an employee who is blind in one eye and the
employee subsequently loses the other eye in a job-related injury, the employee then suffers a permanent and total disability. Under the Minnesota workers' compensation statute, the compensation for the loss of an eye is 66 %%of the daily wage at the time of injury
REV.
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hire a person suffering from a physical impairment. The employer's response was to administer strict pre-employment physicals and questionnaires to reduce the workers' compensation risk
by selective hiring standards. Self insurers were more cautious in
this regard. The effect was that those persons with congenital or
acquired impairments were hindered in their search for employment, particularly with the more sophisticated employers."
Accordingly, pressure was exerted on the state legislatures by
employers to limit their risk and by employees' organizations to
encourage the hiring of the physically impaired. This pressure resulted in the enactment of the so-called second injury or special
compensation fund statutes.' 2 If the risk assumed by the employer
is lessened by a second injury law, so runs the rationale, the employee will benefit.
II.

THE CONCEPT OF THE SECOND INJURY FUND

The basic purpose of the typical second injury law is to encourage employers to offer employment opportunities to individuals with an established physical impairment, due either to a prior
industrial accident or to other causes. 13 The statutory scheme imposes complete liability upon the employer of a person hired with
a prior physical disability for a subsequent disability arising out of
an industrial accident sustained in his employ. This scheme ensures that the employee receives full compensation under the act.
The employer then has the right to seek reimbursement from the
4
special fund once certain statutory requirements are met.'
during 160 weeks. See MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3(21) (Supp. 1979). The combined
effect of the injuries, however, results in compensation of 66 V% of the daily wage at the
time of injury during the entire period of permanent total disability. See t'd. § 176.101(4).
11. The premium for workers' compensation insurance is affected by the "experience"
of the employer, i.e., claims paid by the insurer, and by the relative hazard of the particular employer's business. See Fabing & Barrow, Encouragement of Employment of the Handi
capped-Extension of Second Inuky Fund 1'nap.les to Persons HavIng Latent Impairments, 8 VAND.
L. REV. 575, 578-79 (1955).
12. See, e.g., Note, Workmen's Compensation in New Mexco." Pre-exirstig Conditionsand the
Subsequent Injuy Act, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 632, 638-39 (1967).

Seegenerally 2 A. LARSON,

supra note 1, § 59.30 (1976).
13. See, e.g., White v. Weinberger Builders, Inc., 49 Mich. App. 430, 435, 212 N.W.2d
307, 310 (1973); Amberg v. Olivia Nursing Home, 306 Minn. 330, 332, 236 N.W.2d 785,
786 (1975); Koski v. Erie Mining Co., 300 Minn. 1, 5-6, 223 N.W.2d 470, 473 (1973);
Haverland v. Twin City Milk Producers Ass'n, 273 Minn. 481, 489, 142 N.W.2d 274, 280
(1966); Beson v. Carleton College, 271 Minn. 268, 273, 136 N.W.2d 82, 86-87 (1965);
Hegdahl v. City of Minneapolis, 268 Minn. 412, 416, 129 N.W.2d 798, 801 (1964).
14. See, e.g., Act of May 11, 1979, ch. 79-40, § 37, 1979 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 311, 352
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The payment from any state's second injury fund is a function
of the workers' compensation law of that state. The variety of
workers' compensation statutes has led to equally variegated second injury laws.15 Nearly all states have some form of second injury law. 16 But to say that all states have a second injury law is to
say nothing, because the laws vary from broad coverage to restrictive coverage.' 7 For example, in 1978, South Dakota had five
(West) (to be codified as FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.49); MINN. STAT. § 176.131 (1978 &
Supp. 1979). Of the 28 states responding to the Center for Public Representation's study
of second-injury funds, 57% of the high-claim states (those with disbursements of $900,000
or more) require the employer to pay the total benefit and then apply for reimbursement;
in 29% of the high-claim states, the employee must apply for compensation. See Center for
Public Representation, Study of Second Injury Funds 33 (1979) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office). In 75% of the medium-claim states (disbursements of $100,000 to
$900,000), and 50% of the low-claim states (disbursements of less than $100,000) the employee must apply to the fund for benefits. See id.
15. Because a second-injury fund is one feature of an integrated workers' compensation statute, the variety of compensation schedules for injury arising out of and in the
course of employment is reflected in the compensation schedules for second injuries. For
example, when an employee in South Dakota suffers added permanent partial disability
from a subsequent injury, he is entitled to "one-half of the difference between the average
amount which he earned before the accident, and the average amount which he is earning
or is able to earn in some suitable employment or business after the accident." S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 62-4-5 (1978). But the award can be no greater than the "average
weekly wage in the state." Id. § 62-4-3.
In Kentucky, when an employee's second injury combines with a previous injury and
causes permanent partial disability that would not have occurred had there been no preexisting injury, the second-injury fund pays for the added disability. See Kv. REv. STAT.
§ 342.120 (1977). The employee receives altogether "66 2/3 percent of the [employee's]
average weekly earnings . . . multiplied by the percentage of disability caused by the
injury." Id. § 342.730(b). Limitations on awards are imposed as follows:
The minimum weekly income benefits for disability shall not be less than 20
percent . . . and the maximum weekly income benefits shall not exceed 60 percent . . . of the average weekly wage of the state as defined herein. In any event,
income benefits shall not exceed the average weekly wage of the injured employee.
Id. § 342.740.
In Wisconsin, when the subsequent injury results in permanent partial disability, the
employee shall receive "such proportion of the weekly indemnity rate for total disability as
the actual wage loss of the injured employe bears to his average weekly wage at the time of
his injury." WtS. STAT. ANN. § 102.43(2) (West 1973 & Cum. Supp. 1980-1981).
16. See 2 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 59.31, at 10-286 to -287 (1976).
17. Differing prerequisites for second-injury fund disbursement work to restrict or expand coverage. For example, the required previous injury or physical impairment varies
from the restrictive loss, or loss of use of "one hand, one arm, one foot, one leg, or one eye,"
IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.64 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980), to a physical impairment due to
"accident, disease, birth, military action, or any other cause," such that the impairment
"is obvious and apparent from observation or examination by an ordinary layman,"
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 171 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980), to "a known physical
impairment which is due to any previous accident, disease or any congenital condition
and is, or is likely to be, a hindrance or obstacle to. . . employment," MASS. GEN. LAWS
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claims against its second injury fund and paid out nothing. Minnesota had about 400 claims and paid out over five million dollars.' 8 Given such a spectrum, there is no point in writing about
second injury laws in general. This Article examines Minnesota's
Special Compensation Fund, specifically, the law after it was rewritten in 1965 and its subsequent amendments,' 9 the Legislature's intent when passing the law, and its interpretation by the
Minnesota Supreme Court.
ANN. ch. 152, § 37 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981), to the expansive disability "from a

compensable injury, occupational disease, preexisting disease, or otherwise," or "a dormant nondisabling disease or condition which was aroused or brought into disabling reality" by the second injury. Ky. REV. STAT. § 342.120(l)(a)-(b) (1977).
Also, the requirement of knowledge of the employee's previous physical impairment
varies from at least some actual knowledge by the employer of the permanent and disabling nature to the preexisting impairment of the employee, see McCoy v. Perlite Concrete Co., 53 A.D.2d 749, 749, 384 N.Y.S.2d 234, 235 (1976) (mem.), to actual knowledge
by someone, not necessarily the employer, that can be proved by prior medical records or
by the employer within 30 days after the date of employment, see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 152, § 37 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981), to registration of the employee's preexisting
physical impairment with the Commissioner of Labor and Industry, see MINN. STAT.
§ 176.13 1(3)(b) (Supp. 1979), to no requirement of previous knowledge by the employer,
or even the employee. See Subsequent Injuries Fund v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 56
Cal. 2d 842, 845-46, 366 P.2d 496, 497-98, 17 Cal. Rptr. 144, 145-46 (1961).
18. See Center for Public Representation, supra note 14, at 26. For a comparison of
other states' second-injury statutes and disbursements, see id.
Of the 28 states responding to the Center for Public Representation's study, the following was found to be characteristic of the high-claim states (those that pay out over
$900,000 per year): broad coverage of preexisting conditions often coupled with a list of
qualifying disabilities and broad coverage of resulting disabilities covering death as well as
disability. See id. at 32-33. Only 29% of the high-claim states cover soley permanent total
disability, whereas 66% of the low-claim states (disbursements under $100,000) and 50% of
the medium-claim states (disbursements between $100,000 and $900,000) require a resulting permanent total disability. See id. at 33. The high-claim states also tend to cover
disabilities caused by the preexisting condition, to cover medical as well as compensation
benefits, to require the employer to apply to the fund for reimbursement, and to require
the employer to have prior knowledge of the preexisting disability. See id.
An example of a state with a restrictive second-injury fund is Wisconsin. The applicable statute limits preexisting conditions and second injuries, prohibits coverage for death
or medical expenses, requires application for benefits to be made by the employee, requires no prior knowledge by the employer, and the funding relies totally on special assessments against the employer. See id. at 35-36.
19. Minnesota first enacted a second-injury law in 1913. See Act of Apr. 24, 1913, ch.
467, § 15, 1913 Minn. Laws 675, 683 (repealed 1965). The historical development of Minnesota's second-injury law is complex and beyond the scope of this Article. Basically, the
1913 law nibbled a bit at the problem. It consisted of one paragraph providing for employer liability for the second injury alone. See id. In 1919, payments were authorized
from the special compensation fund. See Act of Apr. 22, 1919, ch. 358, § 1, 1919 Minn.
Laws 382, 382 (repealed 1965). The 1965 statute was a fresh and vigorous departure from
its predecessor. See Act of May 6, 1965, ch. 327, 1965 Minn. Laws 463 (current version at
MINN. STAT. § 176.131 (1978 & Supp. 1979)).
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III.

THE MINNESOTA SECOND INJURY FUND

A.

Basic Slatutory Scheme

The Minnesota second injury law established in 1965 required
the employer to pay all compensation due but the employer could
be reimbursed from the Fund for compensation paid in excess of
twenty-six weeks of benefits and $1,000 in medical expenses if the
employee suffered a disability that was substantially greater because of a preexisting physical impairment than would have resulted from the injury alone.2 0 The law presently allows
reimbursement for compensation paid in excess of fifty-two weeks
2
and $2,000 in medical expenses. '
Under subdivision 2 of the 1965 statute, if the disability or death
would not have occurred except for the preexisting impairment,
the employer paid all compensation due and was reimbursed from
the Fund for all such compensation.2 2 This provision has been al23
tered.
In order to be reimbursed, the injury had to be registered prior
to the subsequent injury. Originally, the law provided for an automatic informal registration under which reimbursement was in24
sured simply by filing a medical report after the industrial injury.
The current statute requires a more formal registration of the im25
pairment to be filed with the Department of Labor and Industry.
The term "physical impairment" was defined as "any physical or
mental condition which is or is likely to be a hindrance or obstacle
20.

See Act of May 6, 1965, ch. 327, § 1, 1965 Minn. Laws 463,463 (current version at

MINN. STAT. § 176.131(1) (1978)); cf.Osterkamp v. Craftsman Press, 312 Minn. 599, 600,

253 N.W.2d 147, 148 (1977) (per curiam) (if disability from subsequent injury not substantially greater because of prior physical impairment, special fund reimbursement will
not be allowed). This provision was subject to an exception:
If the personal injury alone results in permanent partial disability to a
schedule member under section 176.101, the monetary and medical expense limitations shall not apply and the employer shall be liable for such compensation,
medical expense, and retraining attributable to the permanent partial disability,
and he may be reimbursed from the compensation fund only for compensation
paid in excess of such disability.
Act of May 6, 1965, ch. 327, § 1, 1965 Minn. Laws 463, 463.
21. See MINN. STAT. § 176.131(1) (1978).
22. See Act of May 6, 1965, ch. 327, § 1, 1965 Minn. Laws 463, 463 (current version at
MINN. STAT. § 176.131(2) (1978)).
23. See MINN. STAT. § 176.131(2) (1978) (complete reimbursement allowed only
when prior injury is diabetes, hemophilia, or seizures).
24. See Act of May 6, 1965, ch. 327, § 1, 1965 Minn. Laws 463, 464 (current version at
MINN. STAT. § 176.131(4) (1978)).
25. See MINN. STAT. § 176.131(4) (1978).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1980

7

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 4
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6

to obtaining employment. ' 26 The present law specifically lists
27
physical impairments that may be compensated by the Fund.
JudicialInterpretationof the Statute

B.
I.

The Role of the Expert Witness

The 1965 statute has been amended considerably. 28 Large sums
of money were at stake and this guaranteed appeals. The Minnesota Supreme Court, in a number of decisions, has attempted to
clarify the language and legislative intent of Minnesota's second
injury law. Flansburgv. Gt'za29 foreshadowed things to come, since
it was the first of many reversals of the Workers' Compensation
Court of Appeals by the Minnesota Supreme Court when construing the second injury law. In Flansburg the plaintiff had a preexisting knee injury and then sustained a second injury while working
for another employer. The question was whether the insurer
would pay a twenty-six week deductible under subdivision 1 or no
deductible under subdivision 2.30 The only medical witness testified that no injury would have occurred except for the impairment. 3 1 The Commission declined to credit fully the unopposed
expert testimony of the sole medical witness, asserting that his
32
opinion "must be interpreted and applied in light of the facts."
The Commission ordered reimbursement under subdivision 1
based upon its conclusion that the plaintiff had not established, as
required by subdivision 2, that the first injury was the proximate
26. Act of May 6, 1965, ch. 327, § 1, 1965 Minn. Laws 463, 464 (current version at
176.131(8) (1978)).
27. See MINN. STAT. § 176.131(8) (1978) (listing 14 specified impairments, permitting
others to be prescribed by rule, and covering other impairments for which 50 weeks of
permanent partial disability compensation would be payable).
28. See Act of May 6, 1965, ch. 327, § 1, 1965 Minn. Laws 463, 463 (amended 1967,
1969, 1971, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1979) (current version at MINN. STAT. § 176.131 (1978
& Supp. 1979)). For a discussion of the 1971 amendments, see notes 57, 59 infta and
accompanying text.
29. 284 Minn. 199, 169 N.W.2d 744 (1969).
30. The 26 week deductible was applicable when the second injury would itself produce a disablement but was substantially greater because of the preexisting disability. See
Flansburg v. Giza, 284 Minn. 199, 201, 169 N.W.2d 744, 746 (1969); Act of May 6, 1965,
ch. 327, § 1, 1965 Minn. Laws 463, 463 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 176.131(1)
(1978)). The employer-insurer would have been reimbursed for all compensation if the
second injury would not have occurred except for the preexisting physical impairment.
See Flansburg v. Giza, 284 Minn. at 201, 169 N.W.2d at 746; Act of May 6, 1965, ch. 327,
§ 1, 1965 Minn. Laws 463, 463 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 176.131(2) (1978)).
31. S e 284 Minn. at 201, 169 N.W.2d at 746.
32. Id.
MINN. STAT. §
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cause of the second injury.3 3 The supreme court rejected the Commission's restrictive reading of subdivision 2 and also stated that
the Commission "was not free to disregard the unopposed medical
testimony which supported a finding prerequisite to the application of subd. 2. " 34 This approach gave the Commission less authority in factfinding than is given to juries. 35 No authority was
cited in Flansburg for the position taken by the court. Essentially,
Flansburg held that whenever there is testimony as to a medical
" 'tis," that side prevails, unless the other side can produce a medical " 'tain't," in which case the factfinder may choose.
Some of the troops were evacuated from that judicial outpost in
Tuomela v. Reserve Mznng Co. 36 In Tuomela, although the sole medi-

cal witness testified that the disability was substantially greater because of a preexisting injury, the court, in affirming the
Commission, found sufficient evidence to support a finding that
the subsequent injury alone was severe enough to cause the present
disability.3 7 The court in Tuomela distinguished Flansburg by stating: "Furthermore, in Flansburg, we did not say that expert testimony was conclusive upon the trier of fact. We said that such
testimony could not be disregarded.

'38

It appears that Tuomela

represents a departure from the strict position taken by the Flansburg court regarding unopposed expert medical testimony.
33. See id.; cf. Pittack v. Hanna Mining Co., 256 N.W.2d 637, 638-39 (Minn. 1977)
(per curiam) (no reimbursement under subdivision I if employee's work activities would
not have produced disability in absence of prior injury).
34. 284 Minn. at 201-02, 169 N.W.2d at 746.
35. Compare id. (Workmen's Compensation Commission cannot disregard unopposed
medical testimony) with, e.g., Moratzky v. Wirth, 74 Minn. 146, 148, 76 N.W. 1032, 1033
(1898) (expert opinions not conclusive upon a jury, but are merely evidence for consideration).
36. 299 Minn. 203, 216 N.W.2d 638 (1974) (per curiam).
37. See id. at 203-05, 216 N.W.2d at 639-40. The rule governing review of the Industrial Commission's decisions is that "the findings will not be disturbed unless manifestly
contrary to the evidence or . . . the inferences permissible therefrom would require reasonable minds to adopt a contrary conclusion." Richter v. Shoppe Plumbing & Heating
Co., 257 Minn. 108, 112, 100 N.W.2d 96, 98 (1959); see, e.g., Strei v. Church of St. Joseph,
290 Minn. 565, 566, 188 N.W.2d 879, 879 (1971) (per curiam); Luthens v. Glencoe Red &
White Store, 264 Minn. 26, 31, 117 N.W.2d 386, 389 (1962); Peterson v. Ruberoid Co.,
261 Minn. 497, 499, 113 N.W.2d 85, 87 (1962); Powers v. Eddy's Baking Co., 261 Minn.
363, 368-69, 112 N.W.2d 625, 629 (1961).
38. 299 Minn. at 204, 216 N.W.2d at 639. The Minnesota Supreme Court has not
required that full credit be given to expert medical testimony concluding that a second
injury was a continuation of a previous injury or a new injury when another expert
presents conflicting testimony. See Grier v. Consumers Servs., Inc., 293 Minn. 270, 273,
198 N.W.2d 281, 283 (1972).
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The Question of Apportionment

The subtle moves of Flansburg and Tuomela were merely a warmup for the main event, Koski v. Erie Mining Co. 39 Prior to Koski, the
Minnesota Supreme Court had approved the apportionment of liability between successive insurers of the same employerO and apportionment between successive employers when an employee's
present compensable disability was due in part to a prior industrial accident under a former employer. 4' The Minnesota

42
Supreme Court, in Haverland v. Twin City Mik Producers Ass'n,

went one step further and applied the apportionment theory to the
pre-1965 second injury law. The court stated:
There is nothing in the language of Minn. St. 1961,
§ 176.13(a), which would bar an employee, suffering disability
resulting in part from an industrial accident sustained under
one employer and in part from a subsequent industrial accident
sustained under a second employer, from seeking compensation
from both such employers in proportion to their respective responsibility for his disability. It also seems clear that there is
nothing in this section which would bar the last employer held
solely liable for compensation under the provisions of § 176.13
from seeking contribution from a former employer for his proportionate share of the total liability for compensation due to
43
the employee.
If a 200 week period of total disability was found to be thirty percent due to injury number one and seventy percent due to injury
number two, then the insurer for injury number one would pay
thirty percent of the cost of the 200 weeks and insurer number two
39. 300 Minn. 1, 223 N.W.2d 470 (1973).
40. See Peterson v. Dairy Distribs., Inc., 269 Minn. 10, 18, 129 N.W.2d 908, 913
(1964); Carpenter v. Arrowhead Steel Prods. Co., 194 Minn. 79, 80-82, 259 N.W. 535, 53637 (1935); Peniston v. City of Marshall, 192 Minn. 132, 134-35, 255 N.W. 860, 861-62
(1934).
41. See Haverland v. Twin City Milk Producers Ass'n, 273 Minn. 481, 487-90, 142
N.W.2d 274, 279-81 (1966); cf.Marsolek v. Miller Waste Mills, 244 Minn. 55, 59-60, 69
N.W.2d 617, 619-20 (1955) (approving apportionment between successive employers, but
holding that first employer's liability had expired). But cf.Lambert's Case, 325 Mass. 516,
518, 91 N.E.2d 228, 229 (1950) (liability imposed upon insurer covering risk at time of
most recent injury); Brinkert v. Kalamazoo Vegetable Parchment Co., 297 Mich. 611,
615, 298 N.W. 301, 303 (1941) (same). See generally Employer's Cas. Co. v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 214 Ark. 40, 46-47, 214 S.W.2d 774, 777 (1948) (apportioning award
between successive insurance carriers); Mund v. Farmers' Coop., Inc., 139 Conn. 338, 34445, 94 A.2d 19, 21-22 (1952) (same); Meszaros v. Goldman, 307 N.Y. 296, 300, 121 N.E.2d
232, 234 (1954) (same); 2 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 59.20 (1976).
42. 273 Minn. 481, 142 N.W.2d 274 (1966).
43. Id. at 487-88, 142 N.W.2d at 279 (footnote omitted).
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would pay seventy percent of the cost. This is a simplification,
since the weekly benefits might differ between the two injuries, but
that was the general idea. The formula is complex.
Given this precedent, the Fund contended in Koski that subdivision 1 of section 176.13144 should be interpreted to mean that the
employer at the time of the second injury would pay its share, after
apportionment between the first employer and the Fund, less the deductible. 45 The employee in Koski had sustained four successive
work-related back injuries that combined to produce permanent
and total disability. It was found that the disability from the third
and fourth injuries was, in each case, substantially greater because
of the first and second injuries. The supreme court reversed the
Commission, holding that apportionment based on causal contributions of the last two injuries was not authorized. The court
stated: "The language of Minn. St. 1969, § 176.131, which is applicable here, is clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal. The statute not only makes no reference to apportionment but the
language used negates any inference of intent that apportionment
be applied. ' '46 The court, in deciding as it did, stated that appor44. The language of the statute interpreted in Koski was the 1965 law. Act of May 6,
1965, ch. 327, § 1, 1965 Minn. Laws 463, 463 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 176.131
(1978 & Supp. 1979)); see Koski v. Erie Mining Co., 300 Minn. 1,223 N.W.2d 470 passbn

(1973). The relevant language is substantially the same as the language of the 1957 law
construed in Haverland v. Twin City Milk Producers Ass'n, 273 Minn. 481, 142 N.W.2d
274 (1966). The major difference is that in 1957 the employer had a 104 week deductible.
See Act of Apr. 29, 1957, ch. 608, § 1, 1957 Minn. Laws 1358, 1358 (repealed 1965). By
1965 the employer's second-injury liability had been limited to 26 weeks for disability
benefits and $1,000 for medical expenses. See Act of May 6, 1965, ch. 327, § 1, 1965 Minn.
Laws 463, 463 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 176.131(1) (1978)).
45. See 300 Minn. at 4-5, 223 N.W.2d at 472. The Commission's argument was that it
would be inequitable to charge the special fund with complete liability for the employee's
subsequent total disability since the first injury contributed 50% to the disability. See id. at
6, 223 N.W.2d at 473. The Commission further argued that full reimbursement "would
imperil the financial stability of the special fund, pervert its purpose, and conflict with our
prior decisions which have recognized and applied the equitable principles of apportionment." Id.
46. Id. at 7, 223 N.W.2d at 473; accord, Lease v. Pemtom, Inc., 305 Minn. 6, 11, 232
N.W.2d 424, 427 (1975); see Thune v. Land O'Lakes Creameries, 302 Minn. 537, 538, 224
N.W.2d 155, 156 (1974) (per curiam). But cf Zacamelski v. Rosco Mfg. Co., 34 A.D.2d
847, 848, 310 N.Y.S.2d 460, 461-62 (1970) (mem.) (special fund not liable for entire result
if evidence sufficient to sustain apportionment). Upon rehearing, the Minnesota Supreme
Court in Koski indicated that the Legislature could still make apportionment available by
dealing with the issue explicitly at the upcoming session if the court had indeed misconstrued the legislative intent. Koski v. Erie Mining Co., 300 Minn. 9, 10, 223 N.W.2d 475,
475 (1974) (per curiam), aJtdon rehearing, 300 Minn. 1, 223 N.W.2d 470 (1973); cf.Wallace
v. Hanson Silo Co., 305 Minn. 395, 397, 235 N.W.2d 363, 364 (1975) (rule denying apportionment between work-related injury and preexisting non-occupational condition is un-
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tionment would conflict with the purpose of providing an incentive to an employer "to hire or retain a physically impaired person
without being deterred by incurring potentially greater liability
47
for injuries which aggravate the preexisting infirmity.
Once decided, Koski altered the game considerably. Under
Koski, when there is a second injury and the Fund is liable, the last
insurer must pay all benefits and is reimbursed from the Fund (no

apportionment) for everything over the deductible. As an illustration of the complexity of workers' compensation litigation after
Koski', several possible problems are set out below:
Problem /-Employers became altruistic beyond anyone's remembrance, helping those who would, in a less kindly time,
have been permanently and totally disabled employees. They
were returned to work, where they, to no one's astonishment,
would have a final aggravation (zle. second injury) and the employer would be free of liability after payment of the deductible.
Problem 2-Employers no longer needed to worry about finding
an easier job for the employee returning to work after a back
injury. If he was registered with the Fund, the total exposure
was the deductible. It became wiser to have Joe, bad back and
all, do the lifting than have healthy Harry do it. Harry, if he
hurt his back, might cost countless dollars; Joe could only cost
the amount of the deductible.
Problem 3-The courtroom ambience was altered. Everybody
in the courtroom, except the reporter and the attorney for the
Fund, now wanted to have the Fund found liable because if
that happened:
a. The hearing judge eluded the complexities of apportionment.
b. The prior employer(s) escaped liability.
c. The last employer was reimbursed from the
Fund.
d. The employee knew (or soon found out) that the
last employer would not push him so hard to return to
work if the employer was being reimbursed from the
Fund.
e. The employee's attorney knew that the latter infair and should be amended). When the employee's first injury was not registered,
however, a second injury does not involve the Special Compensation Fund. Apportionment may then be applied in deciding liabilities between two successive employers. See
Goetz v. Bulk Commodity Carriers, 303 Minn. 197, 199-200, 226 N.W.2d 888, 890 (1975).
47. Koski v. Erie Mining Co., 300 Minn. at 8, 223 N.W.2d at 474 (footnote omitted);
see Hegdahl v. City of Minneapolis, 268 Minn. 412, 416, 129 N.W.2d 798, 801 (1964).
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jury was at a higher rate and this affected his fee. His
view was much like that of his client in d above.
Sometimes the attorney had the idea first.

Certain strategies emerged because of Koski. For instance, if
there was a question of whether or not there had been a second
injury, the first insurer might pay the deductible to the second insurer and the second insurer would agree that there, indeed, had
been a second injury. The Fund would then pay. The first insurer
would now be safe because there would be no apportionment; the
second insurer would not even have the deductible to pay.
C

Registration

1. Informal Registration
Another problem involving Minnesota's second injury law was
the informal registration of rather vaguely defined physical impairments. The mere filing of a medical report after the initial
injury qualified the employer for reimbursement following a second injury. The original 1965 version of section 176.131 of Minnesota Statutes, permitting automatic registration for "any physical
or mental condition which is or is likely to be a hindrance or obstacle to obtaining employment, ' 48 proved too loose. Every deviation
from perfection was seen as a registerable impairment. 49 For example, a most interesting battle was whether obesity was a registerable impairment.50 Certainly obesity is an impairment but how
does one define it? One physician's obesity is another physician's
plumpness, perhaps depending on the physician's own physique.
If it is a given fraction over the standard weight, then what standard should be used? Would employers be given a chance to fatten up a prospect who found himself not quite up to the point
48. Act of May 6, 1965, ch. 327, § 1, 1965 Minn. Laws 463, 464 (current version at
MINN. STAT. §

176.131(8) (1978)).

49. See, e.g., DeHaan v. Farmers Union Marketing & Processing Ass'n, 302 Minn.
552, 225 N.W.2d 21 (1975) (per curiam) (physical impairment causing continuing obstacle
to employment is registerable and can necessitate use of state's second-injury fund); cf.
Equitable Equip. Co. v. Hardy, 558 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1977) (although prior back injury
was not manifest or causing economic disability, second-injury fund can be used because
employer knew of back injuries that affected employee's condition).
50. Cf Shirley v. Triangle Maintenance Corp., 41 A.D.2d 800, 801, 341 N.Y.S.2d
709, 711-12 (1973) (mem.) (since physician's report indicated claimant could lose weight,
obesity was not a permanent disability involving liability of special fund); Durdaller v.
Liberty Prods. Corp., 16 A.D.2d 849, 849-50, 227 N.Y.S.2d 534, 535 (mem.) (obesity resulting from a permanent glandular condition is prior permanent physical impairment
within second-injury statute), aff'dmem., 12 N.Y.2d 787, 235 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1962).
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when he becomes obese? Would the weight have to be maintained
to the time of the second injury? Would dieting become a form of
disloyalty to the employer, "unregistering" the employee? There is
an impaircertainly some question of public policy in registering
51
ment that is within the control of the employee.
The question of whether a medical report alone, indicating a
temporary disability, was sufficient to comply with the statutory
provisions relating to registration was specifically addressed in De-

Haan v. Farmers Union Marketing & ProcessingAss'n.52 The registration requirements at the time provided for registration of an
injured employee: (1) by a formal document listing the impairment filed with the Commission; or (2) by reason of a prior injury
for which medical reports showing the impairment had been filed
with the Commission.5 3 In DeHaan the medical report stated "L5
disc syndrome" and "severely sore back," indicating a temporary
total disability. No permanent partial disability benefits were paid
and no other medical reports were filed. The Commission held
that the physician's report did not constitute a medical report indicating a physical impairment and denied reimbursement from the
Fund. 54 The supreme court reversed, stating:
If an employer, then, would significantly weigh a consideration of a prior injury in selecting an employee, the employee
can be said to have an impairment to his employability ...
[A]n employer could well regard someone with a previous "disc
of whether or not he
syndrome" as a bad risk . . . regardless
55

was permanently partially disabled.

The supreme court also found that the physician's report was
51. Cf Shirley v. Triangle Maintenance Corp., 41 A.D.2d 800, 801, 341 N.Y.S.2d
709, 711-12 (1973) (mem.) (if claimant can lose weight, obesity is not a permanent disability covered by the special fund).
52. 302 Minn. 552, 225 N.W.2d 21 (1975) (per curiam).
53. See Act of May 6, 1965, ch. 327, § 1, 1965 Minn. Laws 463, 463-64 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 176.131(3)-(4) (1978 & Supp. 1979)). The statute provided:
Subd. 3. To entitle the employer to secure reimbursement from the special
compensation fund, the following provisions must be complied with:
(b) The employee with a pre-existing physical impairment must have been
registered with the commission prior to the employee's personal injury.
Subd. 4. If the employee's pre-existing physical impairment has been
caused by a personal injury for which medical reports, showing the impairment
have been filed with the commission and for which compensation has been paid
under Chapter 176, the employee shall be deemed to be registered.
Id.
54. 302 Minn. at 553, 225 N.W.2d at 22.
55. Id. at 554-55, 225 N.W.2d at 23.
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clearly sufficient to register the impairment.56
2. Formal Registration
DeHaan became pass6 because a 1971 amendment eliminated
this type of registration. 5 7 Registration may now be made only by
filing a formal registration of the impairment with the Department
of Labor and Industry.58 In addition, the questions that arose over
debatable impairments led to the precise setting out of those im59
pairments that are registerable.
Elimination of informal registration brought up a new problem.
What if, after the elimination of this informal registration, an employee was injured who was not formally registered but whose
medical reports, filed in a previous industrial injury during the
time of the more generous statute, showed an impairment that
made the second injury substantially greater? Was the employee
still registered or did the change in the law require formal registration as a requisite for recovery from the Fund?
Lutz v. Spencer Packing Co. ,6 Stangel v. Lakeland Construction Co. ,61
and Miller v. Norris Creameries62 specifically addressed this issue.

The question in these cases was simply what law would governthe law relating to recovery from the Fund at the time of the second injury or the law at the time of the registration? The supreme
court, in reversing the Commission, held that the law in effect at
the time of the registration determined whether or not the employee was registered. 63 Registration was held to vest a right to
56. Id. at 555, 225 N.W.2d at 24.
57. See Act of May 27, 1971, ch. 589, § 3, 1971 Minn. Laws 1094, 1095 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 176.131(4) (1978)) (requiring formal registration with the Commission).
58. See MINN. STAT. § 176.131(4) (1978) ("Any employer who hires or retains in his
employment any person who has a physical impairment shall file a formal registration for
each such employee with the commissioner of the department of labor and industry in
such form as the commissioner may require.").
59. See Act of May 27, 1971, ch. 589, § 4, 1971 Minn. Laws 1094, 1095-96 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 176.131(8) (1978)). About half of the states restrict the special fund to
obvious impairments such as loss of eyes or members. See 2 A. LARSON, supra note 1,
§ 59.30, at 10-303 (1976). The other half do not restrict the fund to such losses of members, but tend to cover general injuries as well. See id. at 10-303 to -305.
60. 304 Minn. 1, 229 N.W.2d 14 (1975).
61. 306 Minn. 86, 235 N.W.2d 200 (1975).
62. 311 Minn. 343, 250 N.W.2d 161 (1976) (per curiam).
63. See Miller v. Norris Creameries, 311 Minn. 343, 345, 250 N.W.2d 161, 162 (1976)
(per curiam) (registration in compliance with law in existence when registration was filed
is valid controlling event); Stangel v. Lakehead Constr. Co., 306 Minn. 86, 88, 235 N.W.2d
200, 202 (1975) (statutory amendment does not retroactively repeal previous registration);
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reimbursement that will not be destroyed even though the Legislature amends the statute prior to the second injury. 64 The court in
Lutz rationalized that "the legislature did not intend to bring
about the inequities which would result from giving retroactive
effect to the 1969 amendment and, in effect, repealing retroactively the prior statutory provisions for automatic registration on
which employers and compensation carriers have justifiably relied."

65

Another problem that arose from the elimination of informal
registration was addressed in Amberg v. Olz'vz'a Nursing Home. 66 The

question was whether a formal registration, once accepted by the
Commission, could be disregarded after the subsequent injury if it
was found not to have complied with the rules of the Commission
at the time of its filing. The supreme court, reversing the Commission, held that if the registration had not been objected to by the
time of the second injury it was valid. 67 The rationale was that the
purpose of the second injury statute would be defeated if an employer could not rely on registration in its decision to employ
68
handicapped persons.
D.

Physical Impairmeni

As amended in 1971, the second injury statute set out certain
physical impairments that could be registered, including "[a]ny
other physical impairment for which at least 50 weeks or more of
weekly benefits would be payable as permanent partial disability if
the physical impairment were evaluated according to standards
Lutz v. Spencer Packing Co., 304 Minn. 1, 3, 229 N.W.2d 14, 16 (1975) (stricter requirements of statutory amendment do not apply retroactively to previously registered injury);
cf., Jones v. Honeywell, Inc., 281 N.W.2d 696, 698 (Minn. 1979) (although employee
deemed registered if medical report filed at time of first injury, reimbursement denied
when employer filed medical report after formal registration was required); Fryhling v.
Acrometal Prods., Inc., 269 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Minn. 1978) (reimbursement determined by
statute in effect at time original disability was registered); Osterkamp v. Craftsman Press,
312 Minn. 599, 600, 253 N.W.2d 147, 148 (1977) (per curiam) (employee deemed registered under 1969 statute could not lose registration status upon statutory amendment with
different registration requirements).
64. See Miller v. Norris Creameries, 311 Minn. 343, 345, 250 N.W.2d 161, 162 (1976)
(per curiam); note 63 supra.
65. Lutz v. Spencer Packing Co., 304 Minn. 1, 3-4, 229 N.W.2d 14, 16 (1975).
66. 306 Minn. 330, 236 N.W.2d 785 (1975).
67. See id. at 332, 236 N.W.2d at 786.
68. See td.
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used in workmen's compensation proceedings. '69 The'question of
whether the term "physical impairment" was limited to an impairment of one member of one's body was addressed in Quik v. Electric
Machinerg Manufacturzng Co. 70 In Quirk the employee sustained a
personal injury resulting in ten percent permanent partial disability to both hands and wrists. Because of this injury, the employee
sustained a second injury resulting in permanent total disability.
The Commission denied reimbursement, ruling that the first injury was not a "physical impairment" within the statute. 71 The
workers' compensation law provided benefits of forty-four weeks
for both hands and wrists, plus a fifteen percent increment for simultaneous injuries, totalling 50.6 weeks. 72 No one member totalled fifty weeks. The Commission ruled that the employee had
sustained two separate impairments to two separate members. It
construed the statute to require fifty weeks of benefits to one scheduled member and held that the employee's prior injuries did not
constitute a registerable impairment.7 3 The supreme court reversed, holding that the term "physical impairment" referred to
the total impairment of one's body and was not limited to one
74
member of the body.
The holding in Quirk brings up a purely philosophical point: almost any human, aged forty or so, who has not led a halcyon life,
is registerable under the terms of Quirk. A trick elbow, say five
percent of the arm (13.5 weeks) plus five percent of the back (everyone aged forty has five percent (twenty-five weeks) of the back)
plus diminished lung capacity (city air plus cigarettes) say five percent because of damage to an internal organ (twenty-five weeks)
totals 63.5 weeks. Over the line with weeks to spare!
E

Other Special Fund Questions

Reimbursement under section 176.131 creates other problems
that increase as the number of Fund cases increase. The first problem is that an insurer, who, in a case of long-term disability, is
being reimbursed by the Fund, has little financial incentive to urge
69. Act of May 27, 1971, ch. 589, § 4, 1971 Minn. Laws 1094, 1095-96 (codified at
176.131(8)(o) (1978)).
70. 306 Minn. 326, 236 N.W.2d 782 (1975).
71. Id. at 327, 236 N.W.2d at 783.
72. See id. at 328, 236 N.W.2d at 784; MINN. STAT. § 176.101, subd. 3(13), (46) (Supp.
1979).
73. See 306 Minn. at 327-29, 236 N.W.2d at 783-84.
74. See id. at 329-30, 236 N.W.2d at 784-85.

MINN. STAT. §

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1980

17

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 4
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6

the employee back to work. There is some incentive due to the
expense of keeping the file open and making payments, but there is
not the same urgency as when the insurer is making unreimbursed
payments. This problem, in large part, solved itself prior to Koski,
for if the earlier insurer was paying some portion of the disability,
without reimbursement, that insurer would often police the file
75
more vigorously than the insurer who was being reimbursed.
Second, the deductible, fifty-two weeks and $2,000,76 should be
adjusted so that the insurer will not prefer, in a clear Fund case, to
pay the deductible rather than assert valid but expensive defenses.
In considering this factor, one must not forget that, as the deductible gets larger, the employer is more reluctant to hire the impaired
employee. At a moderate rate of $200.00 per week, the deductible
of fifty-two weeks and $2,000 in medical expenses would total
$12,400.00. Whether that is the proper figure is a subject for legislative debate.
A third problem is the ongoing question, "Who shall be registered?" The supreme court, in Quirk, construed the statute to allow almost any mature citizen with persistence and imagination to
be registered. 77 If we register half the employees in the state, will
we be helping the truly impaired? If the Legislature tightens the
requirements for registration, those registered under the more generous law would remain registered. 78 This also is a subject for legislative debate.
IV.

A

COMPARISON OF OTHER STATE'S FUNDS

The cases outlined above are not an exhaustive list of Fund
cases. They consist of the cases concerned with the philosophy of
the Special Compensation Fund-what was it intended to do?
What did the Legislature intend? In searching out this judicial
will-o-the-wisp, the Minnesota Supreme Court and the Commis75. The supreme court in Koski held apportionment was not applicable. Thus, the
first employer escaped liability after a subsequent injury and the last employer was held
fully liable, subject to the applicable reimbursement from the Fund. See notes 46-47 supra
and accompanying text.
76. See MINN. STAT. § 176.131(1) (1978).
77. See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
78. See Jones v. Honeywell, Inc., 281 N.W.2d 696, 698 (Minn. 1979); Osterkamp v.
Craftsman Press, 312 Minn. 599, 600, 253 N.W.2d 147, 148 (1977) (per curiam); Miller v.
Norris Creameries, 311 Minn. 343, 345-46, 250 N.W.2d 161, 162-63 (1976) (per curiam);
Stangel v. Lakehead Constr. Co., 306 Minn. 86, 87-88, 235 N.W.2d 200, 201-02 (1975);
Lutz v. Spencer Packing Co., 304 Minn. 1, 3-4, 229 N.W.2d 14, 16 (1975); note 63 supra
and accompanying text.
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sion explored different acreage, for in all except Tuomela, a per
curiam opinion,7 9 the supreme court reversed the Commission.
Further, each of the reversals expanded the pay-out from the
Fund. 0 Of the twenty-eight states responding to the questionnaire
sent out by the Center for Public Representation, 8' Minnesota's
82
Special Compensation Fund pays out the highest per capita.
The six highest reporting states are:
Minnesota
$1.34 per capita
New Jersey
$1.31 per capita
Michigan
$ .92 per capita
$ .61 per capita
Kansas
New York
$ .51 per capita
$ .37 per capita 3
Oklahoma
Certainly, it is not a fault or virtue to lead the group as Minnesota does. It also is not a fault or virtue to bring up the rear, for, as
stated above, the amount paid from a second injury fund is the
product of many variables.8 4 One thing is clear, however; section
176.131 of Minnesota Statutes plays an active part in the Minnesota workers' compensation drama. Certain courtroom problems
arise, as mentioned above, when the Special Compensation Fund
is involved.
V.

CONCLUSION

All the foregoing is interesting enough, but facts are helpful only
when they allow us to reach conclusions and to alter our behavior.
If one only wants facts, the best source is a phone directory. One
can make certain pertinent observations, however, based on the
foregoing. The first is that the Minnesota Supreme Court has
viewed the second injury law as a deus ex machtha. Anything entitled "The Special Compensation Fund" is likely to be viewed as
having, in its deep pocket, something for everyone. On the basis of
the questions posed in the cases digested above, the thinking of the
79. See
curiam).
80. See
81. See
82. See

Tuomela v. Reserve Mining Co., 299 Minn. 203, 216 N.W.2d 638 (1974) (per

notes 29-74 supra and accompanying text.
note 18 supra.
Center for Public Representation, supra note 14, at 26. The formula used is:
from the fund for calendar 1978
payout per capita = amount disbursed
population of state (1970
census).

83. This chart is based upon data from the Center for Public Representation, see i.,
compared with population figures from the 1970 census.
84. See notes 15-18 supra and accompanying text.
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Minnesota Supreme Court went beyond that of the Workers'
Compensation Court of Appeals, a body generally considered liberal.
It is further certain that section 176.131 has evolved, by construction, into quite a different creature than its accoucheurs envisaged. Presently, the Special Compensation Fund is involved in
about 500 second injury cases annually. 85 That certainly makes
the Fund an integral part of the system.
The foregoing are certainties. There are also some probabilities.
The Fund has generally been a force for good. For example, those
suffering from epilepsy have been helped, without a doubt. The
fear that an employee may injure himself because of a seizure is
grossly disproportionate to the risk. There are many people registered for epilepsy and in ten years representing the Fund the author has never seen an injury caused by an epileptic seizure that
resulted in permanent partial disability. This particular fact has
been spread as widely as possible through talks to employers' organizations and epilepsy-oriented groups. Many diabetics are registered and one may assume that the Fund is a substantial factor in
their continued employment and was a factor, for many, in being
considered for employment. Most second injury claims, however,
concern back injuries, and here one cannot be so certain. Many
companies will not hire a person with back problems until he is
registered. No one can say whether he would have been hired if
there were no Fund. One could quantify this by a study, which
would impress those people who are impressed by studies, but one
cannot honestly say more than that the Fund probably assists
many persons with back problems to find work. Regrettably, it
also encourages some employers to keep people in work too strenuous for them.
Further, the insurers and, to a lesser extent, the self insurers,
have been very cooperative in defending Fund cases on questions
of basic liability, extent of permanency, etc. This is necessary so
that defense attorneys do not someday find that the Fund has
taken over the entire defense of all Fund cases.
The Minnesota second injury law, in its application, falls far
short of perfection. But it is helping many, and no other state is
more aggressively seeking, in this way, to encourage the hiring of
the physically impaired. A nice balance must be struck. As we try
85. See Center for Public Representation, supra note 14, at 26.
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to solve more problems through the Fund, we may cause problems
elsewhere in the workers' compensation system. If Minnesota is to
change its approach from its present orientation, from having the
risk insured by private insurers to having some form of state fund,
this should be done by legislation and not by expanding the role of
the Fund. Most important, we must, in the midst of the tumult,
constantly remind ourselves that the main purpose of the Special
Compensation Fund is to encourage the hiring of the physically
impaired. If legislators, insurers, attorneys, and assistant attorneys
general keep that in mind, they cannot go far astray.
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